27 avril 2026 | Guide
Venture Capital in Switzerland: Country
Comparative Guide 2026
27 avril 2026 | Guide
Venture Capital in Switzerland: Country
Comparative Guide 2026
Are there specific legal requirements or preferences regarding the choice of entity and/or equity structure for early-stage businesses that are seeking venture capital funding in the jurisdiction?
Swiss startups can select either a stock corporation or a limited liability company as their legal entity. Whilst a limited liability company may be attractive for founders due to lower minimum capital requirements at incorporation (CHF 20,000 for a limited liability company vs. CHF 100,000 for a stock corporation, whereby CHF 50,000 need to be paid-in), stock corporations are typically preferred as shareholders and share transfers do not require registration with the commercial register (as is the case with a limited liability company) which is burdensome (e.g., in case of a broad shareholder base due to an ESOP) and unattractive for investors from a confidentiality standpoint.
There are no particular Swiss legal rules that require startups to have a certain equity structure. Like in other jurisdictions, the equity structure of Swiss startups is typically layered with common shares being held by the founders (and employees), and preferred shares being held by investors. Preferred shares typically carry non-participating liquidation/exit preferences and conversion rights.
What are the principal legal documents for a venture capital equity investment in the jurisdiction and are any of them publicly filed or otherwise available to the public?
The principal legal documents for a VC investment in Switzerland are typically a non-binding term sheet which sets out the commercial and legal cornerstones of the investment and is then formalized in the investment agreement (incl. subscription form), the shareholders’ agreement, the articles of association and the board regulations. Of these documents, only the articles of association are filed with the commercial register and become publicly available. For confidentiality reasons, the parties therefore often abstain from “hardwiring” detailed provisions from the shareholders’ agreement into the articles, thereby relying on contractual protections only.
Is there a venture capital industry body in the jurisdiction and, if so, does it provide template investment documents? If so, how common is it to deviate from such templates and does this evolve as companies move from seed to larger rounds?
The key venture capital industry body in Switzerland is the Swiss Private Equity & Corporate Finance Association (SECA). SECA provides model documentation for VC investments, including templates for term sheets, convertible loans, investment agreements, shareholders’ agreements, articles of associations and board regulations.
SECA’s templates often form the basis of the investment documentation in early-stage financing rounds but it should be noted that the templates are on the investor friendly side. The nature and extent of deviations are primarily driven by the specifics of the transaction, including the negotiation power and preferences of the involved parties. On the timeline, deviations from templates tend to increase along the funding stages as initial deviations are typically carried forward and new deviations are negotiated in each round.
Are there any general merger control, anti-trust/competition and/or foreign direct investment regimes applicable to venture capital investments in the jurisdiction?
Swiss merger control and anti-trust regulations are set out in the Swiss Cartel Act and its ordinances. An investment is notifiable in Switzerland if the investor(s) acquire(s) (sole or joint) control over the target company and if additionally, either the applicable turnover thresholds ((1) combined turnover of all undertakings concerned of at least CHF 2bn worldwide or at least CHF 500m in Switzerland and (2) individual turnover of at least two of the undertakings concerned of at least CHF 100m in Switzerland) are met or if one of the undertakings concerned has been held by the Competition Commission to be dominant and the investment concerns the same or a neighbouring/upstream/downstream market. Due to high turnover thresholds, VC investments are rarely notifiable in Switzerland. Anti-trust considerations otherwise often play a role in connection with non-compete/non-solicit undertakings in shareholders’ agreements.
Unlike many other jurisdictions, Switzerland does not (yet) have a comprehensive FDI regime. After a lengthy political process, the Swiss Investment Screening Act was adopted by the Swiss Parliament in the final vote on 19 December 2025. The new Investment Screening Act is expected to enter into force no earlier than 2027.
In line with Switzerland’s traditionally open approach toward foreign investors, the aim is to address security-related risks in a targeted manner while minimizing any adverse impact on the welfare-enhancing effects of foreign direct investment. Against this backdrop, a foreign direct investment is subject to a notification requirement if the following conditions are met: (1) it constitutes an acquisition of control; (2) of a domestic (Swiss) company; (3) by a foreign state-owned investor; (4) in a (security-)critical sector; (5) above the relevant turnover thresholds. Until approval is granted, enforcement is prohibited. Accordingly, investments by private foreign investors remain outside the scope.
What is the process, and internal approvals needed, for a company issuing shares to investors in the jurisdiction and are there any related taxes or notary (or other fees) payable?
A Swiss stock corporation (or limited liability company) can issue shares by way of an ordinary share capital increase, a share capital increase out of conditional capital, or a share capital increase based on a capital band (which replaced the so-called “authorized share capital” at the beginning of 2023). The issuance of shares to investors in the context of VC investments is typically done by way of an ordinary share capital increase for which broadly the following process applies:
In a first step, the board proposes a share capital increase and convenes an extraordinary general meeting (EGM) with at least 20 days’ prior notice. If all shares are represented (universal meeting), no convocation is required. In a second step, the EGM (with simple majority in case of a cash capital increase and qualified majority in case of a non-cash capital increase or if the statutory subscription right of the shareholders is curtailed or excluded) resolves on the capital increase in front of a notary public. In addition, where a company has already issued preference shares, the law requires that any further issuance of preference shares conferring preferential rights over the existing preference shares may only be made with the consent a special meeting of the adversely affected holders of the existing preference shares, unless otherwise provided in the articles of association. The capital increase must then be implemented by the board within six months, i.e., investors subscribe for the new shares (by executing a subscription form) and pay the subscription (or at least the nominal) amount onto a blocked bank account in the name of the company whereafter the board issues a capital increase report (which must be audited in case of non-cash capital increases or in case the statutory subscription right of the shareholders is curtailed or excluded) and resolves on the ascertainment of the capital increase and the amendment of the articles of association in front of a notary public. In a last step, the board submits the commercial register application for registration of the capital increase. The capital increase takes effect with registration in the commercial register (upon which funds can be released from the blocked bank account and be paid onto an operating bank account of the company).
In the context of VC investments, the above steps (up to and including the commercial register application) are typically completed on the same day following pre-payment of the subscription (or nominal) amount onto the blocked bank account. The registration of the capital increase with the commercial register typically takes between three to seven business days from submission of the application (although delays can be expected during the holiday period).
The issuance of shares (including any share premium) by a Swiss stock corporation (or limited liability company) is subject to a 1% stamp duty on invested funds which exceed a one-time exempt threshold of CHF 1m. Fees for notarization depend on the canton and the notary but are generally based on the transaction value with ranges and caps (e.g., fees for notarizations in connection with capital increases in the canton of Zurich amount to 1‰ of the capital increase amount and range between CHF 500 and CHF 5,000 for non-listed and smaller companies not subject to an ordinary audit).
How prevalent is participation from investors that are not venture capital funds, including angel investors, family offices, high net worth individuals, and corporate venture capital?
Angel investors, family offices, and high net worth individuals play an important role in the Swiss VC ecosystem. Their participation is particularly prevalent in seed and early-stage financings. Corporate venture capital, like most VC funds, in general tend to target later financing rounds.
What is the typical investment period for a venture capital fund in the jurisdiction?
Like in other jurisdictions, the investment period for a VC fund in Switzerland is usually the first three to five years of a fund’s life cycle which typically ranges between 10 to 12 years (subject to extensions).
What are the key investment terms which a venture investor looks for in the jurisdiction including representations and warranties, class of share, board representation (and observers), voting and other control rights, redemption rights, anti-dilution protection and information rights?
The key investment terms which a VC investor is looking for in Switzerland may vary depending on factors such as investment stage, equity stake, and investment approach but typically include:
What are the key features of the liability regime (e.g. monetary damages vs. compensatory capital increase) that apply to venture capital investments in the jurisdiction?
Founders often lack liquidity and Swiss corporate law puts restrictions on the distribution of funds to shareholders (so called prohibition on capital repayments), investment agreements often provide for a compensatory capital increase and/or transfer of founder shares at nominal value as compensation mechanisms in case of damages resulting from a breach of R&W.
How common are arrangement/ monitoring fees for investors in the jurisdiction?
VC funds who act as lead investors in financing rounds will frequently lead the due diligence and request company to cover reasonable legal fees and expenses incurred by their counsel (sometimes such costs are capped / agreed in the term sheet). In addition, lead investors sometimes also request arrangement / monitoring fees but typically such fees are rather seen in private equity set-ups in Switzerland.
Are founders and senior management typically subject to restrictive covenants following ceasing to be an employee and/or shareholder and, if so, what is their general scope and duration?
Founders and senior management are typically subject to post-contractual non-compete/non-solicit undertakings in the shareholders’ agreement and/or employment agreements.
In terms of scope, non-compete undertakings generally cover the company’s current product/service offering whilst non-solicit undertakings generally prohibit the active solicitation of the company’s employees and customers. Geographically, non-compete/non-solicit undertakings typically cover the company’s current (main) sales markets and potentially markets where market entry is imminent.
In terms of permissible duration, Swiss competition and employment law sets certain restrictions. The permissible duration of non-compete/non-solicit undertakings in shareholders’ agreements depends on whether the relevant shareholder(s) has/have (sole or joint) control over the company. In case of control, such undertakings may be entered into for up to three years after the relevant shareholder ceases having control. For non-controlling employed shareholders, undertakings may be justified for up to 12–24 months after termination of employment (although no reliable case law exists). In employment agreements, such clauses may be entered into for up to three years, but typically limited to 12–18 months due to enforceability concerns.
To ensure compliance, such undertakings are frequently backed by contractual penalties.
How are employees typically incentivised in venture capital backed companies (e.g. share options or other equity-based incentives)?
The most frequently seen incentive schemes for employees in Swiss VC backed companies are share option plans (for actual equity) or phantom share plans (for synthetic equity).
Whilst phantom share plans are administratively easier to implement, “hard” equity participation via share options is often preferable from a tax perspective.
Phantom shares are taxed as salary income and subject to income tax and social security. Employee shares may allow tax-exempt capital gains after a holding period (generally five years).
Commercially, dilution from employee incentive schemes is often a key negotiation point.
What are the most commonly used vesting/good and bad leaver provisions that apply to founders/ senior management in venture capital backed companies?
(Reverse) vesting schedules are common, typically 3–5 years with a one-year cliff and acceleration upon exit.
Good-/bad-leaver provisions depend on thresholds such as “good cause” or “justified reason.” Underperformance alone typically does not qualify as bad leaver.
Vested good-leaver shares are usually repurchased at fair market value; bad-leaver shares at nominal value or discount.
What have been the main areas of negotiation between investors, founders, and the company in the investment documentation, over the last 24 months?
Declining investment activity has made fundraising harder, increasing the use of bridge financing via convertible loans.
Key negotiation points include valuation caps, discounts, and anti-dilution protections, especially in down-rounds.
How prevalent is the use of convertible debt (e.g. convertible loan notes) and advance subscription agreement/ SAFEs in the jurisdiction?
Convertible loans are widely used for seed or bridge financing.
SAFEs and similar instruments are uncommon due to legal and tax inefficiencies in Switzerland.
What are the customary terms of convertible debt (e.g. convertible loan notes) and advance subscription agreement/ SAFEs in the jurisdiction and are there standard form documents?
Convertible loan agreements typically include interest, valuation cap/discount, conversion triggers, and subordination clauses.
Subordination is key to avoid over-indebtedness and bankruptcy obligations.
Standard templates are provided by SECA.
How prevalent is the use of venture or growth debt as an alternative or supplement to equity fundraisings or other debt financing in the last 24 months?
Venture debt is less common than in the US but has grown in importance as a supplementary or alternative financing source.
What are the customary terms of venture or growth debt in the jurisdiction and are there standard form documents?
Typical terms include covenants, representations, default events, collateral, and equity kickers (e.g., warrants).
No standard form documents currently exist.
What are the current market trends for venture capital in the jurisdiction (including the exits of venture backed companies) and do you see this changing in the next year?
Investment declined in 2023 and 2024 but showed recovery in 2025, especially in later-stage rounds.
Cleantech and biotech sectors were particularly active.
Are any developments anticipated in the next 12 months, including any proposed legislative reforms that are relevant for venture capital investors in the jurisdiction?
The Swiss Investment Screening Act (adopted 2025) is expected to enter into force around 2027.
A reform extending tax loss carry-forward periods from 7 to 10 years may benefit startups.
Legal 500, Switzerland: Venture Capital, 2026
Swiss startups can select either a stock corporation or a limited liability company as their legal entity. Whilst a limited liability company may be attractive for founders due to lower minimum capital requirements at incorporation (CHF 20,000 for a limited liability company vs. CHF 100,000 for a stock corporation, whereby CHF 50,000 need to be paid-in), stock corporations are typically preferred as shareholders and share transfers do not require registration with the commercial register (as is the case with a limited liability company) which is burdensome (e.g., in case of a broad shareholder base due to an ESOP) and unattractive for investors from a confidentiality standpoint.
There are no particular Swiss legal rules that require startups to have a certain equity structure. Like in other jurisdictions, the equity structure of Swiss startups is typically layered with common shares being held by the founders (and employees), and preferred shares being held by investors. Preferred shares typically carry non-participating liquidation/exit preferences and conversion rights.
What are the principal legal documents for a venture capital equity investment in the jurisdiction and are any of them publicly filed or otherwise available to the public?
The principal legal documents for a VC investment in Switzerland are typically a non-binding term sheet which sets out the commercial and legal cornerstones of the investment and is then formalized in the investment agreement (incl. subscription form), the shareholders’ agreement, the articles of association and the board regulations. Of these documents, only the articles of association are filed with the commercial register and become publicly available. For confidentiality reasons, the parties therefore often abstain from “hardwiring” detailed provisions from the shareholders’ agreement into the articles, thereby relying on contractual protections only.
Is there a venture capital industry body in the jurisdiction and, if so, does it provide template investment documents? If so, how common is it to deviate from such templates and does this evolve as companies move from seed to larger rounds?
The key venture capital industry body in Switzerland is the Swiss Private Equity & Corporate Finance Association (SECA). SECA provides model documentation for VC investments, including templates for term sheets, convertible loans, investment agreements, shareholders’ agreements, articles of associations and board regulations.
SECA’s templates often form the basis of the investment documentation in early-stage financing rounds but it should be noted that the templates are on the investor friendly side. The nature and extent of deviations are primarily driven by the specifics of the transaction, including the negotiation power and preferences of the involved parties. On the timeline, deviations from templates tend to increase along the funding stages as initial deviations are typically carried forward and new deviations are negotiated in each round.
Are there any general merger control, anti-trust/competition and/or foreign direct investment regimes applicable to venture capital investments in the jurisdiction?
Swiss merger control and anti-trust regulations are set out in the Swiss Cartel Act and its ordinances. An investment is notifiable in Switzerland if the investor(s) acquire(s) (sole or joint) control over the target company and if additionally, either the applicable turnover thresholds ((1) combined turnover of all undertakings concerned of at least CHF 2bn worldwide or at least CHF 500m in Switzerland and (2) individual turnover of at least two of the undertakings concerned of at least CHF 100m in Switzerland) are met or if one of the undertakings concerned has been held by the Competition Commission to be dominant and the investment concerns the same or a neighbouring/upstream/downstream market. Due to high turnover thresholds, VC investments are rarely notifiable in Switzerland. Anti-trust considerations otherwise often play a role in connection with non-compete/non-solicit undertakings in shareholders’ agreements.
Unlike many other jurisdictions, Switzerland does not (yet) have a comprehensive FDI regime. After a lengthy political process, the Swiss Investment Screening Act was adopted by the Swiss Parliament in the final vote on 19 December 2025. The new Investment Screening Act is expected to enter into force no earlier than 2027.
In line with Switzerland’s traditionally open approach toward foreign investors, the aim is to address security-related risks in a targeted manner while minimizing any adverse impact on the welfare-enhancing effects of foreign direct investment. Against this backdrop, a foreign direct investment is subject to a notification requirement if the following conditions are met: (1) it constitutes an acquisition of control; (2) of a domestic (Swiss) company; (3) by a foreign state-owned investor; (4) in a (security-)critical sector; (5) above the relevant turnover thresholds. Until approval is granted, enforcement is prohibited. Accordingly, investments by private foreign investors remain outside the scope.
What is the process, and internal approvals needed, for a company issuing shares to investors in the jurisdiction and are there any related taxes or notary (or other fees) payable?
A Swiss stock corporation (or limited liability company) can issue shares by way of an ordinary share capital increase, a share capital increase out of conditional capital, or a share capital increase based on a capital band (which replaced the so-called “authorized share capital” at the beginning of 2023). The issuance of shares to investors in the context of VC investments is typically done by way of an ordinary share capital increase for which broadly the following process applies:
In a first step, the board proposes a share capital increase and convenes an extraordinary general meeting (EGM) with at least 20 days’ prior notice. If all shares are represented (universal meeting), no convocation is required. In a second step, the EGM (with simple majority in case of a cash capital increase and qualified majority in case of a non-cash capital increase or if the statutory subscription right of the shareholders is curtailed or excluded) resolves on the capital increase in front of a notary public. In addition, where a company has already issued preference shares, the law requires that any further issuance of preference shares conferring preferential rights over the existing preference shares may only be made with the consent a special meeting of the adversely affected holders of the existing preference shares, unless otherwise provided in the articles of association. The capital increase must then be implemented by the board within six months, i.e., investors subscribe for the new shares (by executing a subscription form) and pay the subscription (or at least the nominal) amount onto a blocked bank account in the name of the company whereafter the board issues a capital increase report (which must be audited in case of non-cash capital increases or in case the statutory subscription right of the shareholders is curtailed or excluded) and resolves on the ascertainment of the capital increase and the amendment of the articles of association in front of a notary public. In a last step, the board submits the commercial register application for registration of the capital increase. The capital increase takes effect with registration in the commercial register (upon which funds can be released from the blocked bank account and be paid onto an operating bank account of the company).
In the context of VC investments, the above steps (up to and including the commercial register application) are typically completed on the same day following pre-payment of the subscription (or nominal) amount onto the blocked bank account. The registration of the capital increase with the commercial register typically takes between three to seven business days from submission of the application (although delays can be expected during the holiday period).
The issuance of shares (including any share premium) by a Swiss stock corporation (or limited liability company) is subject to a 1% stamp duty on invested funds which exceed a one-time exempt threshold of CHF 1m. Fees for notarization depend on the canton and the notary but are generally based on the transaction value with ranges and caps (e.g., fees for notarizations in connection with capital increases in the canton of Zurich amount to 1‰ of the capital increase amount and range between CHF 500 and CHF 5,000 for non-listed and smaller companies not subject to an ordinary audit).
How prevalent is participation from investors that are not venture capital funds, including angel investors, family offices, high net worth individuals, and corporate venture capital?
Angel investors, family offices, and high net worth individuals play an important role in the Swiss VC ecosystem. Their participation is particularly prevalent in seed and early-stage financings. Corporate venture capital, like most VC funds, in general tend to target later financing rounds.
What is the typical investment period for a venture capital fund in the jurisdiction?
Like in other jurisdictions, the investment period for a VC fund in Switzerland is usually the first three to five years of a fund’s life cycle which typically ranges between 10 to 12 years (subject to extensions).
What are the key investment terms which a venture investor looks for in the jurisdiction including representations and warranties, class of share, board representation (and observers), voting and other control rights, redemption rights, anti-dilution protection and information rights?
The key investment terms which a VC investor is looking for in Switzerland may vary depending on factors such as investment stage, equity stake, and investment approach but typically include:
- R&W: R&W are typically given by the company and/or the founders and cover fundamental, tax/social security, and business matters (often with a particular focus on IP, IT, and data protection in a tech-driven startup environment).
- Class of share: investors typically ask for preferred shares, which rank senior to ordinary shares held by the founders.
- Liquidation preference: preferred shares subscribed for by investors typically carry a (one-time) non-participating liquidation/exit preference and conversion rights.
- Anti-dilution: anti-dilution provisions offering down-round protection for investors are standard in Swiss VC transactions. The broad-based weighted average method is the most common adjustment method.
- Governance/information rights: depending on the equity stake and investment approach, investors may seek board representation or at least board observer rights and in any case information rights (regular financial information, KPIs, budget).
- Reserved matters: investors always request (fundamental) veto rights for investment protection (e.g., amendment of articles, issuance of senior ranking shares, voluntary liquidation, etc.) and depending on acquired stake and investment approach may additionally request strategic or even operational veto rights.
- Exit rights: investors typically seek exit rights to secure liquidity for their investment such as the right to initiate an exit after a certain holding period, tag-along, and drag-along rights (with down-side protection).
What are the key features of the liability regime (e.g. monetary damages vs. compensatory capital increase) that apply to venture capital investments in the jurisdiction?
Founders often lack liquidity and Swiss corporate law puts restrictions on the distribution of funds to shareholders (so called prohibition on capital repayments), investment agreements often provide for a compensatory capital increase and/or transfer of founder shares at nominal value as compensation mechanisms in case of damages resulting from a breach of R&W.
How common are arrangement/ monitoring fees for investors in the jurisdiction?
VC funds who act as lead investors in financing rounds will frequently lead the due diligence and request company to cover reasonable legal fees and expenses incurred by their counsel (sometimes such costs are capped / agreed in the term sheet). In addition, lead investors sometimes also request arrangement / monitoring fees but typically such fees are rather seen in private equity set-ups in Switzerland.
Are founders and senior management typically subject to restrictive covenants following ceasing to be an employee and/or shareholder and, if so, what is their general scope and duration?
Founders and senior management are typically subject to post-contractual non-compete/non-solicit undertakings in the shareholders’ agreement and/or employment agreements.
In terms of scope, non-compete undertakings generally cover the company’s current product/service offering whilst non-solicit undertakings generally prohibit the active solicitation of the company’s employees and customers. Geographically, non-compete/non-solicit undertakings typically cover the company’s current (main) sales markets and potentially markets where market entry is imminent.
In terms of permissible duration, Swiss competition and employment law sets certain restrictions. The permissible duration of non-compete/non-solicit undertakings in shareholders’ agreements depends on whether the relevant shareholder(s) has/have (sole or joint) control over the company. In case of control, such undertakings may be entered into for up to three years after the relevant shareholder ceases having control. For non-controlling employed shareholders, undertakings may be justified for up to 12–24 months after termination of employment (although no reliable case law exists). In employment agreements, such clauses may be entered into for up to three years, but typically limited to 12–18 months due to enforceability concerns.
To ensure compliance, such undertakings are frequently backed by contractual penalties.
How are employees typically incentivised in venture capital backed companies (e.g. share options or other equity-based incentives)?
The most frequently seen incentive schemes for employees in Swiss VC backed companies are share option plans (for actual equity) or phantom share plans (for synthetic equity).
Whilst phantom share plans are administratively easier to implement, “hard” equity participation via share options is often preferable from a tax perspective.
Phantom shares are taxed as salary income and subject to income tax and social security. Employee shares may allow tax-exempt capital gains after a holding period (generally five years).
Commercially, dilution from employee incentive schemes is often a key negotiation point.
What are the most commonly used vesting/good and bad leaver provisions that apply to founders/ senior management in venture capital backed companies?
(Reverse) vesting schedules are common, typically 3–5 years with a one-year cliff and acceleration upon exit.
Good-/bad-leaver provisions depend on thresholds such as “good cause” or “justified reason.” Underperformance alone typically does not qualify as bad leaver.
Vested good-leaver shares are usually repurchased at fair market value; bad-leaver shares at nominal value or discount.
What have been the main areas of negotiation between investors, founders, and the company in the investment documentation, over the last 24 months?
Declining investment activity has made fundraising harder, increasing the use of bridge financing via convertible loans.
Key negotiation points include valuation caps, discounts, and anti-dilution protections, especially in down-rounds.
How prevalent is the use of convertible debt (e.g. convertible loan notes) and advance subscription agreement/ SAFEs in the jurisdiction?
Convertible loans are widely used for seed or bridge financing.
SAFEs and similar instruments are uncommon due to legal and tax inefficiencies in Switzerland.
What are the customary terms of convertible debt (e.g. convertible loan notes) and advance subscription agreement/ SAFEs in the jurisdiction and are there standard form documents?
Convertible loan agreements typically include interest, valuation cap/discount, conversion triggers, and subordination clauses.
Subordination is key to avoid over-indebtedness and bankruptcy obligations.
Standard templates are provided by SECA.
How prevalent is the use of venture or growth debt as an alternative or supplement to equity fundraisings or other debt financing in the last 24 months?
Venture debt is less common than in the US but has grown in importance as a supplementary or alternative financing source.
What are the customary terms of venture or growth debt in the jurisdiction and are there standard form documents?
Typical terms include covenants, representations, default events, collateral, and equity kickers (e.g., warrants).
No standard form documents currently exist.
What are the current market trends for venture capital in the jurisdiction (including the exits of venture backed companies) and do you see this changing in the next year?
Investment declined in 2023 and 2024 but showed recovery in 2025, especially in later-stage rounds.
Cleantech and biotech sectors were particularly active.
Are any developments anticipated in the next 12 months, including any proposed legislative reforms that are relevant for venture capital investors in the jurisdiction?
The Swiss Investment Screening Act (adopted 2025) is expected to enter into force around 2027.
A reform extending tax loss carry-forward periods from 7 to 10 years may benefit startups.
Legal 500, Switzerland: Venture Capital, 2026
